University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
INTSORMIL Scientific Publications

International Sorghum and Millet Collaborative
Research Support Program (INTSORMIL CRSP)

7-16-2012

Intensive Production of Millet and Sorghum for Evolving Markets
in the Sahel
John H. Sanders
Purdue University

Botorou Ouendeba
INTSORMIL (Niger)

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/intsormilpubs
Part of the Agribusiness Commons, and the Agronomy and Crop Sciences Commons

Sanders, John H. and Ouendeba, Botorou, "Intensive Production of Millet and Sorghum for Evolving
Markets in the Sahel" (2012). INTSORMIL Scientific Publications. 14.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/intsormilpubs/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the International Sorghum and Millet Collaborative
Research Support Program (INTSORMIL CRSP) at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in INTSORMIL Scientific Publications by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Intensive Production of Millet and Sorghum for
Evolving Markets in the Sahel

John H. Sanders, Purdue University and Botorou Ouendeba, INTSORMIL, Niger

Funded by USAID through the Sorghum, Millet and Other Grains Collaborative Research
Support Program (INTSORMIL CRSP)

Leader with Associates Cooperative Agreement No. EEP-A-00-06-0016-00
July 16, 2012

1

One principal constraint to improving the performance of millet and sorghum systems is overcoming the
conventional wisdom. The conventional wisdom has some or all of these characteristics depending upon
where you hear it. “Sorghum and millet are subsistence crops.” “They do not respond to fertilization.”
“Even if they do respond to fertilizer, it is not profitable.” “Farmers will not use fertilization on these
crops even if there were agronomic and economic responses.” “Banks will not lend to farmers for
sorghum and millet fertilization.”

From Pilot Project to Scaling Up
With a pilot project we wanted to disprove these assertions and create a model for a
widespread scaling up process. We started our activities in 2003 with the concept that a series of
changes would need to be incorporated into the farmers’ production systems to enable overcoming the
initial adverse element of very low soil nutrients. There are new technologies available for these crops
as there has been substantial research investment in sorghum and millet in the Sahel since the great
televised drought of 1968-1973. Technology development focused on new cultivars but there were a
series of other associated technologies including fertilization research. Our concern and that of national
governments and donors was that so little of these new technology developments were getting out of
the station and onto farmers’ fields.
So how to explain this transfer failure? The emphasis on low input solutions certainly is a culprit.
It makes no sense to look for a low input solution to increasing cereal yields when the basic nutrients are
deficient. 1 That is similar to telling poor, malnourished people they have to eat less. Farmers are poor
and often access to credit is difficult. But let’s look at the problem from the opposite direction. We have
to provide sufficient soil nutrient for plants to grow even for the new cultivars. So how do we pay for the
increased expenditures for moderate fertilization and improved cultivars? Rather than focus on low
inputs to reduce costs and thereby neglect the essential role of the basic plant nutrients in increasing
yields, we focus on improved marketing strategies and new institutions to raise the prices of products
received and reduce the costs of inputs. So the focus is on increasing revenue rather than reducing input
use.
The marketing strategy is the key to technology diffusion but innovations in extension and credit
are also necessary. The second hypothesis concerns extension methods. It is that few farmers respond
to demonstration trials. They believe that they cannot reproduce these results because they cannot get
access to the inputs or pay for them or they cannot handle the increased management requirements of
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Much intellectual energy has been spent on the low input search over the past two to three decades in the
Sahel. Generally this reduction in input use is substituted for with sophisticated management practices such as
rotation and N fixation for the legume in a cereal-legume system. These low input recommendations fail to
appreciate the complexity of their recommended practices as starter N and micro nutrients are often required
for successful N fixation. Moreover, the burden of proof is now on the low input promoters after more than
two decades of failure. There have been some successes in encouraging improved manure use with increased
compost heaps in many regions of the Sahel especially in Burkina Faso. Also in Burkina Faso a series of water
retention devices have been introduced. All of these practiced have then been imitated in other Sahelian
countries.
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low input strategies. Farmers react to what other farmers in their region do rather than to outside
demonstrators or advisers so a village level approach to extension is necessary.
Finally, with respect to credit. Banks look for either collateral and/or personal knowledge of
borrowers to reduce default risk. Since small farmers generally don’t have land ownership for collateral
in West Africa or know bankers, new institutions are necessary to make these connections. These new
institutions, farmers’ associations, handle default risk as is done in micro-credit. All must reimburse or
there is no future credit so there are substantial group pressures to reimburse. Moreover, there is group
pressure to only include those members most likely to reimburse.

Development of a Marketing Strategy
In developing a marketing strategy let’s first look at how millet and sorghum prices perform
seasonally and between years. Figures 1 and 2 below show the normalized prices by month over the six
year period, 2003-2009. All prices are put at the base of 100 to illustrate the percentage changes. Note
the collapse of the millet and sorghum prices in November-December. Note also that in poor rainfall
years price increases of 50 to 100% are observed in the “sodure” or hungry period in the fall before the
next harvest. These price increases in adverse rainfall years are especially important because in these
years even though farmers with moderate fertilization out yield farmers with traditional practices, they
still need some help on the revenue side.
There are five ways employed here to improve the product prices of sorghum and millet: 1)
First, if farmers have access to storage facilities they can avoid selling at the post harvest price collapse
period; 2) secondly, we identify new markets beyond the first two stages of local or village buyer and
regional town buyer. We are especially interested in millet food processors in the major cities and in
broiler producers for sorghum; 3) The third alternative is to add value to the cereals. Millet processors
in Bamako have reported an average of 13% impurities in the millet bought in urban markets (Toure et
al, 2007, p. 14). For millet processors having access to clean cereals is especially important to protect
their machines and to assure customer satisfaction. They are generally willing after a negotiation
struggle to pay a price premium for higher quality of approximately 20 cfa/kg (exchange rate in summer
of 2012 510 cfa/kg). Quality can be increased at the farm level by

Figure 1 (Source: Estimated by J. Coulibaly from data in the National Marketing Watch (OMA-Mali)
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Figure 2 (Source: J. Coulibaly, 2011, p. 32.)
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not putting the heads on the ground at harvest and doing the threshing on plastic or canvas; 4 ) Fourth is
the increased bargaining power. When farmers sell through farmers’ associations, they can do all the
functions of the large “commerçant.” The farmers’ associations then gather small quantities of cereals,
store, do a price search for the best buyer and sell in quantity. It takes time for the farmers’ associations
to gain confidence of the members and to function as a marketing cooperative including the purchase of
sufficient quantities of inputs to obtain price discounts; 5) Fifth, involves presentations and publications
that are designed to help convince public officials that they should not intervene to reduce cereal prices
except in the worst drought years. 2
For our extension approach the basic concept is that farmers do not respond to demonstration
trials. Demonstration trials are principally for the benefit of researchers. So we conduct village level
extension looking for the participation of 50 farmers in a given village. Even with this village approach
often only 20 to 30% of the farmers will diligently follow the recommendations. But in the second year
of the project there will be an imitation of the successful farmers.
Our bank constraints are easily identified. Banks want collateral and to know the borrower.
Banks have been willing to make loans to established farmers’ associations that have bank accounts. To
introduce banks from the start of the process we need a new institution to handle the default risk and to
know the individual borrowers. The loans of all need to be repaid to make the associations qualified for
a loan in the next year. The farmers’ association needs to function like the small groups in micro-credit
programs.
With micro-credit the borrowers screen the other borrowers for their repayment expectations.
It has also been shown that micro-credit groups will allow a member with a suspected lower propensity
to repay to be in the group if she makes an insurance deposit to the group (for a review of group
pressures and group selection see Shahriar, 2012, p. 37). Handling default risk in a bigger group such as
with 50 to 150 members is a larger challenge than with the five to ten members of micro-credit groups.
But the micro-credit evolution illustrates this to be a successful model and meets the institutional
requirements to respond to the bank’s demands.
Small farmers want favorable interest rates and to be able to repay when the price has
recovered from the harvest time price collapse. It was necessary to negotiate with the banks to get
loans with longer repayment periods. When the final buyers make contracts with farmers’ associations
or put up some of the funds for input purchases, banks have been more willing to lend to first year
farmers’ associations. This was the model sought in 2011 and 2012 for the scaling up operation.
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This type of major drought occurs approximately once a decade. In contrast moderately adverse years include
about 15%-25% of the time.See Vitale and Sanders, 2005, p. 120 where adverse years had a probability of 15%; in
Tahirou and Sanders, 2006, p. 276 where 17% was used for adverse rainfall years; Baquedano et al., 2010, p. 421.
Baquedano uses 24%. All three take out the approximate 10% for extreme drought years and then recalculate the
probabilities. The assumption is that farmers expect outside relief in these extreme drought years and so farmers
do not include them in their calculations of the optimum system for the expected weather conditions.
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Conclusions
The integrated strategy focusing on marketing, a new extension method, and credit appears to
be working well. Now average farm yields of 1.5 t/ha for sorghum and 1.2 t/ha of millet are obtained
when farmers follow well the recommendations in good and normal rainfall years. 3 Best sorghum
farmers have gotten 2 to 3 tons/ha of sorghum and millet producers 1.8 to 2 t/ha. As we get sorghum
yields up to 2 tons/ha on average we will be introducing sorghum hybrids to these village associations.
These yields are a solid improvement from 800 kg/ha to one ton/ha for sorghum with traditional
practices in the cotton zone. For millet traditional yields are lower at 400 to 700 kg/ha.
We have obtained 20 to 50% price increases with the implementation of the marketing
strategies over the past five years. As we get better in training marketing and farmers’ associations build
stronger ties to their members, farmers will allow the associations to sell more of their products and this
price advantage will be further increased. Note that this price increase is especially important in adverse
rainfall years as the fertilizer-new cultivar response is much lower then. Our technology still out yields
traditional farmer yields in these adverse years (again with farmers following well the
recommendations) but these price increases are critical then to maintain profitability.
The objectives of the pilot project of refuting conventional wisdom and creating a model for the
scaling up process have been achieved. In the decade we have been working on extending new
technologies in the Sahel for these crops, we have shown that there are other buyers for millet and
sorghum besides subsistence use and even local and regional markets; there is a good fertilizer response
to moderate levels of inorganic fertilizer and it is highly profitable for farmers ( Baquedano et al., 2010;
Coulibaly, 2010; Coulibaly et al. forthcoming; Ibrahim, forthcoming). The marketing strategy is especially
important in adverse rainfall years; banks are presently providing credit for sorghum and millet
production in Mali and Senegal. 4
Moving from a pilot product to scaling up in both Senegal and Mali is an important step. This
scaling up reached 2,000 ha in Senegal and 5,000 ha in Mali in 2011.However, there were 1.4 million ha
of millet in Mali and 746 thousand ha in sorghum in 2004-2007 (mean values in Broughton and Kelly,
2010, p. 2). So there is still a substantial scaling up process necessary to have aggregate effects on yields
3

The basic technology package is one sack of DAP, one sack of Urea, and an improved cultivar treated
with fungicide. Water retention practices are recommended as is manure. Farmers are trained in the labor
intensive agronomic practices. The agronomic and marketing concepts are available in cookbook form (“fiche
technique”) in both Bambara and Dogon (French versions for sorghum and millet in the references). They will be
translated now into Mossi and Hausa. Note that when DAP is not available, we have been forced to substitute for
one sack of DAP with two sacks of NPK. So this indicates the need for the evolution of the fertilizer markets in the
Sahel as the two sacks of NPK is more expensive and not more effective in increasing yields.
4

Banks lent to famers in both countries in 2011 and to Senegal in 2012. With the disruptions in Mali (coup d’etat
and civil war) during 2012 we will need to confirm what is happening there in 2012 with respect to bank lending.
There were an estimated 5,000 ha in Mali and perhaps 2,000 ha in Senegal in 2011. This is direct involvement of
NGOs following program specifications close to our original pilot program. This is not the usual guesstimate of
farmers’ possibly using some new technology. These NGOs can give farmers’ names, areas and quantity of loans.
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and prices. Organizationally we now need to more systematically include banks and final buyers in the
scaling up process.
We have selected the best sites and farmers we could find. Hence, it is important not to
exaggerate the potential for all farmers to follow these practices. Clearly many farmers will not be
interested and not all farmers’ associations will perform well. However, even adopting parts 5 of the
program is expected to have a substantial effect on other farmers producing principally for their own
subsistence. Moreover, these crops are critical food crops in West Africa and a more widespread
adoption of these technologies will lead to cost reductions per output unit and thereby enable food
prices to fall while still encouraging farmers to adopt them. 6
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